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ARE PRIVACY POLICIES INFORMATIONAL
OR IDEOLOGICAL?
Jane Bambauer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Consumer privacy is predominantly regulated through disclosure.1
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) strongly urges American busi-
nesses to notify consumers about their privacy practices, and the
agency is considering requiring “just-in-time” disclosure that would
make these notices more salient and aggressive.2  Many states, includ-
ing California, require companies to provide a privacy policy on their
websites, making mandated disclosure the de facto law for the whole
country.3  Although privacy policies have inspired a rich set of legal
and empirical research,4 the literature has not situated privacy in the
general landscape of mandated disclosure law and policy.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law.
1. This Article addresses compelled disclosures of privacy policies.  It does not concern en-
forcement of promises voluntarily made by companies, which so far have made up much of the
FTC’s privacy enforcement docket.  Such enforcement is trans-substantive and merely clears the
market of fraud. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 617 (2014).
2. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICY MAKERS 48, 61 (2012) [hereinafter FTC,
RAPID CHANGE], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commis-
sion-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyre-
port.pdf; see also Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6501–6506 (2012); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999),
15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809, 6821–6827 (2012).
3. See Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (West
2015); Notice of Intent to Sell Nonpublic Personal Information Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-37-
101 to -203 (LexisNexis 2013).
4. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 1, at 583; see also Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy R
Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2013); Janice Y. Tsai et
al., The Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental Study,
22 INFO. SYS. RES. 254 (2011). See generally Patrick Gage Kelley et al., A “Nutrition Label” for
Privacy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY (2009);
ALAN LEVY & MANOJ HASTAK, CONSUMER COMPREHENSION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY NOTICES:
A REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE QUANTITATIVE TESTING (2008), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/reports/quantitative-research-levy-hastak-report/quantitative_research_-_levy-
hastak_report.pdf; JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., THE TRADEOFF FALLACY: HOW MARKETERS ARE
MISREPRESENTING AMERICAN CONSUMERS AND OPENING THEM UP TO EXPLOITATION (2015),
https://www.asc.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/TradeoffFallacy_1.pdf.
503
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American law has a famously abundant number of mandated disclo-
sure rules.5  For example, companies must provide notice of attributes
as diverse as interest rates and calorie counts.  The legitimacy of these
mandated disclosures falls along a spectrum.  Some disclosures are in-
disputably good policy because they alert consumers about material
risks that all would agree are bad, such as product warnings about
latent dangers.  These long-accepted “informational” disclosures are
within the compelled speech doctrine of the First Amendment.6
Other mandated disclosures are arguably poor policy because they
mislead consumers and cause foreseeable overreactions.  For example,
mandated disclosures about the presence of mercury in vaccines,
about the foreign origins of products, or about raw correlations be-
tween depression and abortion technically consist of factual state-
ments.7  Nevertheless, they should be treated as “ideological”
disclosures running afoul of the compelled speech doctrine.8
Much less is known about the middle of the range.  These mandated
disclosures do not have the virtue of alerting consumers to risks be-
cause they concern attributes that consumers do not consistently see
as positive or negative.  Some disclosures are useful for preference-
matching where consumers value a product more after learning about
an attribute, while others value it less.  Other disclosures are useless,
meaning that consumers informed about the attribute do not change
their valuation at all.  These are wasteful, but not fraudulent or
distortive.
FIGURE 1
DISCLOSURE RANGE
5. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U.
PENN. L. REV. 647, 681–83 (2011). See generally MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE:
THE RISE OF TECHNOPOPULISM (2002).
6. See infra notes 19–20 and accompanying text (discussing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary R
Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)).
7. See Jane Bambauer et al., A Bad Education, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 109 (2017); Daniel I. Rees
& Joseph J. Sabia, The Relationship Between Abortion and Depression: New Evidence from the
Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Studies, MED. SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 1, 2007), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17901849; see also infra note 76 and accompanying text (discuss- R
ing Right to Know Act, AB-1291, 2013–2014 Legis., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013)).
8. See infra notes 21–46 and accompanying text. R
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Compelled speech precedents leave a good deal of uncertainty
about whether mandated disclosures in the middle range are constitu-
tional.9  This uncertainty leaves American privacy law in some doubt,
as privacy disclosures fall in this middle range.10  Mandated privacy
disclosures rarely make a difference to the material interests of con-
sumers as a whole.  At best, privacy policies provide a tool for prefer-
ence-matching, and in some cases they add no value to consumer
decision-making.  For new services that challenge data-collecting and
data-mining conventions, privacy disclosures could be distortive by fo-
cusing the consumer’s attention only on loss-of-data control without
explaining the tradeoffs—the functionality or other benefits that flow
to the user.
This Article presents a theory and practical instrument for distin-
guishing between informational and ideological mandated disclosures.
In previous work, I have developed a theoretical and empirical frame-
work for assessing whether mandated disclosures are good public pol-
icy.11  This Article adapts that work to answer a different question:
How should courts use empirical evidence to define the limits of un-
constitutional compelled speech?  The constitutional limits will not
match the contours of optimal public policy; rather, they will mark a
lower bound for suboptimal mandated disclosures.  I argue that com-
pelled disclosures that cause consumers to overreact—to avoid a
product or service that they would prefer to have if there had been
better, more balanced information—are clearly unconstitutional, and
that compelled disclosures that have no effect on consumers at all are
constitutionally suspect.
Using this framework, the Article presents results from a proof-of-
concept experiment that suggest mandated privacy disclosures may be
constitutionally suspect.  Although privacy notices do not cause con-
sumer overreaction, neither do they have the hallmarks of a useful
notice regime.  These results raise questions about why privacy attrib-
utes are selected for special attention by regulators for mandated dis-
closure.  One explanation is that even if consumers do not respond
negatively to privacy-related notices, they wish to know about a com-
pany’s data practices before making a consumption decision.  This is
descriptively correct—the experimental results show that research
subjects clearly preferred to receive mandated disclosures about pri-
9. Putting constitutionality aside, the literature on mandated disclosure has not illuminated
whether these are worthwhile uses of state power.
10. See infra notes 11–47 and accompanying text. R
11. The experiment is described in more detail in Bambauer et al., A Bad Education, supra
note 7. R
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vacy.  However, the experiment also shows that subjects had a prefer-
ence for mandated disclosures of all product features that were tested,
including disclosures about the presence of mercury in vaccines and
whether foods have been genetically modified.  In other words, con-
sumers always favor disclosure.  Privacy is not special.
An alternative explanation for selecting privacy for special atten-
tion, even when consumers do not use the information to change their
conduct, is that disclosure laws attempt to shape consumers’ future
preferences and nudge companies toward privacy-preserving prac-
tices.  The FTC has not been subtle about this mission.  It has used
disclosure rules as an alternative to the direct regulations of data prac-
tices that it would prefer.12  This use of compulsory disclosure is di-
vorced from any neutral mission to simply inform consumers, and it
flirts with the boundary of ideological compelled speech.
This Article proceeds with a description of the compelled speech
doctrine and its uncertain application to privacy disclosures in Part II.
Part III introduces a clean and testable theory for identifying ideologi-
cal mandated disclosures and applies the test to disclosures about pri-
vacy and other product attributes.  Part IV concludes with some
remarks about factors that regulators should consider, in addition to
the constitutional constraints, when devising a mandated disclosure
scheme about privacy (or anything else).
II. THE LAW OF COMPELLED FACTUAL DISCLOSURES
At first blush, it would seem that legal requirements for companies
to clearly state what their data practices are would be wholly uncon-
troversial.  It requires nothing more than a statement of factual infor-
mation.  Compelled disclosure of accurate facts, however, can be
deceptively ideological.  As the Supreme Court has stated:
[W]e would not immunize a law requiring a speaker favoring a par-
ticular government project to state at the outset of every address the
average cost overruns in similar projects, or a law requiring a
speaker favoring an incumbent candidate to state during every solic-
itation that candidate’s recent travel budget. Although the forego-
ing factual information might be relevant to the listener, and, in the
latter case, could encourage or discourage the listener from making
12. See FTC, RAPID CHANGE, supra note 2, at i (“Although companies use this information to R
innovate and deliver better products and services to consumers, they should not do so at the
expense of consumer privacy.”); see also Julie Brill, Fed. Trade Comm’r, Protecting Consumer
Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: A Discussion of the FTC’s Privacy Report, Remarks Before
the Direct Mktg. Ass’n (Mar. 26, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_
statements/protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-discussion-ftcs-privacy-report/120326
dma.pdf.
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a political donation, a law compelling its disclosure would clearly
and substantially burden the protected speech.13
The government has more latitude to compel factual disclosures
from commercial speakers than political speakers, but this too has sig-
nificant limits.  This Part fleshes out the spectrum of factual disclo-
sures from clearly informational to clearly ideological.
A. Warnings and Consent
At the secure end of the constitutional spectrum are product warn-
ings about latent dangers and instructions for safe use.  These include
both warning obligations developed under the common law, as well as
federal regulations like Food & Drug Administration (FDA) drug la-
beling.  Instructions on dosage for an over-the-counter drug or warn-
ings about the dangers of electrical currents alert consumers about
risks—potential consequences that everybody agrees are bad.  Safety
warnings do more than simply inform consumers; they satisfy gener-
ally applicable rules about efficient precautions.  When viewed as part
of overall product design, warnings provide an excuse for manufactur-
ers to sell something that could otherwise be illegal.14  One way to
recognize these clearly informational mandated disclosures is by ask-
ing whether the underlying law would have prompted the disclosure
to satisfy generally applicable legal duties.
The same ideas govern disclosures made in the process of obtaining
consent.15  For example, the underlying law would treat surgery as a
battery if the patient is not made aware of material risks to their
health.  Thus, laws compelling disclosure about certain types of medi-
cal risks, or even about a sexual partner’s HIV status, formalize what
basic principles of battery law already require.
Mandated privacy disclosures could have this same result if they are
narrowly confined to situations in which a person or company needs
actual consent to lawfully collect or share personal data.  For example,
common law and wiretap statutes prohibit secret interceptions of
13. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988).
14. In fact, under the Third Restatement, warnings may not even be sufficient to discharge
liability if the product could have been cost-effectively designed to avoid the danger. RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1998); see also Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v.
Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 335 (Tex. 1998).  This diverges from the Second Restatement ap-
proach, which treated warnings as presumptively heeded. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume
that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is
followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.”).
15. The law of “informed consent” sweeps broader than consent, and, therefore, raises more
questions about the necessity of compelled disclosure.
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other peoples’ phone calls.16  A mandate requiring companies to alert
customers when their personal communications will be intercepted
does nothing more than respect the substantive rights that consumers
already have in the confidentiality of their communications.
Note that the substantive law itself may be poorly designed.  Wire-
tap laws, for example, may be overly resistant to technological change,
as recent litigation challenging the legality of Gmail has illustrated,17
but these are problems related to the underlying rights and responsi-
bilities of the parties involved rather than with a disclosure rule.  A
mandated disclosure rule would be unobjectionable because it does
nothing more than codify what the law already requires.  Most data
practices governed by mandated disclosure rules do not implicate es-
tablished rights of the data subject.  The practices of collecting In-
ternet browsing data or retaining purchasing data are not illegal and
do not require affirmative consent from consumers.18
B. Disclaimers
Danger warnings and consent requirements do not exhaust the uni-
verse of valuable and constitutional disclosure rules.  Government can
also use disclosure rules to correct for misimpressions that consumers
are likely to have about the consequences of a transaction.  For exam-
ple, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,19 the Supreme
Court upheld a law requiring law firms that use contingency fee struc-
tures to make clear that if the client loses, she may still have to pay
costs (even if there is no fee for attorney services).  The Court applied
only rational basis scrutiny because the disclosure law concerned
“purely factual and uncontroversial information” that was “reasona-
bly related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consum-
ers.”20  Thus, the state can mandate disclosures that function as
disclaimers.  These disclaimers correct impressions that are wrong in
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012); Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 770 (N.Y. 1970).
17. In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918, at *19 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 26, 2013).
18. I have questioned whether some new and invasive practices might qualify as an illegal
intrusion upon seclusion under a modern understanding of that tort. See Jane Yakowitz
Bambauer, The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 255–56 (2012).  The meaning of
“intrusion” would nevertheless have a narrower scope than the full range of data practices sub-
ject to disclosure by COPPA and by FTC guidance documents.
19. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
653 (1985).
20. Id. at 651.
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some “material respect.”21  However, outside of rules that reduce con-
sumer deception, mandated disclosure laws are open to constitutional
challenge.
C. Ideological Factual Disclosures
Courts are inconsistently hostile to factual-disclosure requirements
that attempt to bypass rational decision making processes.  For exam-
ple, a D.C. Circuit panel recently struck down a FDA regulation that
would have required cigarette packaging to contain graphic images of
health problems caused by smoking.22  A mockup of the FDA disclo-
sure is below.23
FIGURE 2
PROPOSED FDA DISCLOSURE
21. JAMES C. MILLER III, FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION
§ IV (Oct. 14, 1983), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/
831014deceptionstmt.pdf (appended to Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984)).
22. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled by
Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (holding that the disclosures
were too burdensome under the Zauderer analysis).
23. Mockup created by David LaFontaine for FairWarning. See Myron Levin, Tobacco Indus-
try Batting a Thousand with Federal Judge, While FDA Strikes Out, FAIRWARNING (Sept. 29,
2014), https://www.fairwarning.org/2014/09/fda-batting-o-3-federal-judge/.
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The D.C. Circuit struck down the regulation because the govern-
ment’s primary goal was to “discourage nonsmokers from initiating
cigarette use and to encourage current smokers to consider quit-
ting.”24  Yet the line between informing and encouraging is not bright.
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit considered an identical challenge and found
that the FDA rule was constitutional.25
The appellate court precedents in the wake of Zauderer are inco-
herent, but three factors emerge from the mess as likely guideposts for
future cases.  First, courts tend to disfavor mandated disclosures that
evoke an emotional response and potentially override rational deci-
sion-making.  The D.C. Circuit Court struck down the graphic ciga-
rette warning law in part because it “shocked” consumers rather than
informing them.26  As Caroline Corbin points out, the government
might wish to evoke emotional responses to nudge consumer behav-
ior: “It is not surprising that the state would want to trigger an emo-
tional response.  Studies have shown that information linked to
emotion is more persuasive than the information alone.”27  It is also
not surprising that courts would give these types of disclosure laws
extra scrutiny because they are designed to bypass what Professor
Kahneman28 calls “slow” and deliberate thinking, in favor of “fast”
decisions.29  Disclosure rules that appeal to emotions may diverge
from the “purely factual” disclosure mandates that receive lower scru-
tiny under Zauderer.
A second, related factor is the judiciary’s disfavor for secret evan-
gelizing.  In the cigarette labeling case, the D.C. Circuit was concerned
that the government was using tobacco manufacturers as a mouth-
piece (or “billboard”) for the government’s anti-smoking campaign.30
This was also a significant determinant of the D.C. Circuit’s decision
to invalidate a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule on
conflict minerals.  The SEC rule required public corporations to dis-
close if any of their product materials originated from the Congo and,
if so, if the purchase of the minerals may have funded civil wars.31
Although the disclosures would have been factual, the court found
24. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 696 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Required Warnings for Cigarette Pack-
ages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,630 (June 22, 2011)).
25. Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 569 (6th Cir. 2012).
26. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 696 F.3d at 1216.
27. Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1289 (2014).
28. Renowned Professor of Psychology at Princeton University.
29. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 20–21; see also Dan M. Kahan, Two
Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 747 (2008).
30. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 696 F.3d at 1211.
31. Nat’l Ass’n Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled by Am. Meat Inst.
v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (en banc).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-2\DPL201.txt unknown Seq: 9  7-JUL-17 11:01
2017] PRIVACY POLICIES 511
that they were also ideological because the law “requires an issuer to
tell consumers that its products are ethically tainted.”32
More generally, courts have shown increasing willingness to investi-
gate and infer whether the government has some ulterior policy objec-
tive outside of correcting consumer deception.  However, this
principle is not consistently followed.  Other circuit courts have up-
held mandated factual disclosures that were just as motivated to per-
suade consumers away from certain products.  For example, a Texas
law requiring physicians who provide abortions to show their patients
an ultrasound image of the fetus was upheld against a First Amend-
ment challenge, even though the state legislature was openly opposed
to abortion and was trying to reduce its incidence.33
The third factor is distortion.  Compelled disclosures, even factual
disclosures, can introduce error by causing consumers to overreact to
the information.34  This aspect of the compelled speech doctrine sim-
ply requires the government to abide by the same rules that the law of
false advertising demands from private parties: It should not force
companies to mislead consumers about a material aspect of the
transaction.35
This factor seems to be the most promising because, in addition to
its common sense, it is utilitarian (looking at results rather than bad
intent) and testable.  Unfortunately, this too is mired in conflicting
precedent.  For example, in 1987 the Supreme Court upheld a law re-
quiring films produced by foreign governments to be labeled as “polit-
ical propaganda” even though the Court acknowledged that
“propaganda” typically has a negative connotation.36  The Court at
that time was willing to take a lenient stance, finding that the statute
avoided classification as ideological because it defined “propaganda”
in a nonperjorative manner.37  More recently, the D.C. Circuit, sitting
en banc, upheld a federal statute requiring all foreign meat to be la-
beled with its country of origin even though the court recognized that
many consumers would wrongly assume that meats externally pro-
32. Id. at 371.  Note that the first indicator the D.C. Circuit used to find a mandated disclosure
rule ideological was that it was not related to preventing consumer deception.
33. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 584 (5th Cir.
2012).  For a thoughtful discussion of this and similar cases, see Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician
Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment’s Limit on Compelled Ideologi-
cal Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2357 (2013).
34. Corbin, supra note 27, at 1294. R
35. Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s Int’l, 227 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2000).
36. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 490 (1987).
37. Id. at 480–81.
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duced are not under supervision of U.S. regulators.38  In fact, the
USDA itself had previously stated that country-of-origin labeling does
not serve any health or safety interests.39  These mandated disclosures
very likely introduced distortion by misleading consumers into antici-
pating risks that did not exist.
Privacy disclosure laws may implicate the second and third factors,
and the FTC’s proposed just-in-time disclosure might raise all three.
Although some of the FTC’s public statements emphasize consumer
choice,40 much of it reveals a clear preference for achieving certain
results: minimizing data-collection and data sharing.41
Most scholars writing in the area share this end goal.  Much of the
literature on the efficacy of privacy disclosures treat a consumer’s will-
ingness to share personal information as evidence of a failure of ra-
tional decision-making, and conversely the literature treats consumer
reserve as a success.42  These scholars are motivated to solve what is
known as the “privacy paradox”—the fact that consumers consistently
and consciously give their personal data away for little to no money
despite consistent assertions that they highly prize their data privacy.43
Privacy researchers are eager to overcome the paradox by finding
fault with the decisions that consumers make (i.e., exposing their data)
rather than with the abstract statements that they make in favor of
privacy.44  A nascent body of research is now finding that however
38. Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).  The court gave
several reasons that the labeling law promoted a substantial state interest including a long his-
tory of country-of-origin labeling, the ability to track and avoid foods from countries that have a
food contamination problem, and simply enabling consumer preferences to “buy American.” Id.
39. Id. at 25.
40. FTC, RAPID CHANGE, supra note 2, at 60. R
41. Id. at 15, 23–24.
42. Idris Adjerid et al., Sleights of Privacy: Framing, Disclosures, and the Limits of Trans-
parency, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY
(2013).  Although the authors make clear in the analysis section that their Experiment 1 is only a
test of framing effects, the introduction and conclusion of the paper uses this evidence to argue
that privacy disclosures fail to adequately steer consumers away from disclosing information.
Id.; see also Leslie K. John et al., Strangers on a Plane: Context-Dependent Willingness to Divulge
Sensitive Information, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 858, 858–59 (2011) (concluding that cues and con-
text cause people to divulge more sensitive information by “downplaying” privacy concerns
without questioning whether the more direct contexts could overemphasize privacy); Tsai et al.,
supra note 4. R
43. Alessandro Acquisti et al., The Economics of Privacy, J. ECON. LIT., June 2016, at 1,
37–38; see also Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy in Electronic Commerce and the Economics of Im-
mediate Gratification, in EC ‘04 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC
COM. 21 (2004) [hereinafter Economics of Immediate Gratification].
44. See Adjerid et al., supra note 42; see also Alessandro Acquisti et al., Gone in 15 Seconds: R
The Limits of Privacy Transparency and Control, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, July 2013, at 72;
Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Imagined Communities: Awareness, Information Sharing,
and Privacy on the Facebook, in PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHS. SYMP. 36 (George Danezis &
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consumers may feel about “privacy” in the abstract, they are making
decisions consistent with their preferences when faced with real-world
tradeoffs.45  Just-in-time privacy disclosure may be an attempt by the
FTC to use disclosure rules to scare consumers into making more
data-cautious choices.  It may be, in other words, an appeal to emo-
tions or policy evangelism.
Privacy disclosures also run some risk of introducing distortions by
misleading consumers about the costs and benefits of a transaction.
The proposed, but unenacted, amendment to California’s Online Pri-
vacy Protection Act would have required companies to state in fewer
than one hundred words what their data collection and dissemination
practices will be.46  This leaves no opportunity for companies to ex-
plain what consumers would lose if data collection were minimized.
These statements will leave consumers insecure about the loss of data
control.  Yet the warnings may not serve their interests because most
consumers greatly prefer free Internet content, which is currently un-
derwritten by advertisers and data aggregators.47
Although privacy disclosures are purely factual, mandates may nev-
ertheless be controversial.  The next Part presents a model for testing
whether compelled disclosures about privacy and other attributes are
ideological.
Philippe Golle eds., 2006); Acquisti, Economics of Immediate Gratification, supra note 43; Ales- R
sandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making,
IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 26; Laura Brandimarte et al., Misplaced Confi-
dences: Privacy and the Control Paradox, in NINTH WORKSHOP ON THE ECON. OF INFO. SECUR-
ITY (2010).
45. Ben-Shahar, supra note 5, at 650, 696; Soren Preibusch, The Value of Privacy in Web R
Search, IEEE SEC. & PRIVACY, Sept./Oct. 2015, at 24 (finding that well-informed consumers
value privacy protections much less than convenience and functionality). See generally Lior Ja-
cob Strahilevitz & Matthew B. Kugler, Is Privacy Policy Language Irrelevant to Consumers?, 45
J. LEGAL STUD. 69 (2017) (finding that consumers understand that they are exchanging control
of their data for functionality and services they want).
46. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (West 2016).
47. See generally Arslan Aziz & Rahul Telang, What Is a Digital Cookie Worth? (2016) (un-
published manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2757325.  Even the
downstream uses of personal data may be far less unfavorable than consumers generally as-
sume—some studies have found that poor and minority data subjects enjoy a net benefit when
employers and creditors use Big Data to make decisions. See James C. Cooper, Separation,
Pooling, and Big Data (Geo. Mason Legal Studies, Research Paper No. LS 15-15, 2016), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2655794 (credit); see also Bambauer, The New In-
trusion, supra note 18, at 269–70 (credit); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimina- R
tion, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 369–71 (2008) (wages); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive
Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010 (2013) (generally).
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III. INFORMATIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL FACTUAL DISCLOSURES
This Part proposes a model that can sort factual disclosures along
the range between informational to ideological.  I describe both the
theory and results of a proof-of-concept study administered using Am-
azon’s Mechanical Turk.48
Throughout this Part, I use reserve prices (the most that a person
would be willing to pay for a product or service) to measure the ef-
fects of disclosure.  In the abstract, I would like to know what a con-
sumer with a fixed set of preferences would pay for an item under
three different conditions: (1) an unwarned consumer who makes a
valuation decision without any disclosure about the attribute selected
for study; (2) a warned consumer who makes the decision with disclo-
sure about the attribute; and (3) the perfectly informed consumer who
makes the decision with perfect information about both the costs and
the benefits of the attribute—benefits typically consisting of the func-
tionality that would be lost if the company were to avoid the attribute.
Perfectly informed consumers have more information than warned
consumers because mandated disclosures rarely supply consumers
with details about the scale of the risks, and companies almost never
provide information about the benefits that would be lost.  Comparing
these three states (unwarned, warned, perfectly informed) can reveal
whether a disclosure is serving a useful function and whether it causes
an overreaction.
Of course, the perfectly informed consumer does not exist, not even
in experimental settings.  We use a moderately well-educated con-
sumer as a proxy for the perfectly informed consumer.  These respon-
dents were given the same notice that the “warned” subjects received,
but in addition, the moderately well-educated consumer received
some basic information about the scale of risks and benefits of the
attribute.
We randomly assigned research subjects to a product and a disclo-
sure level (unwarned, warned, or well-educated) and a then presented
a vignette—a short description that asks the subject to imagine they
are making a decision about buying a good or service.  We then asked
the respondent for their reserve price.  As an illustration, here is what
the subjects assigned to the DNA Kit scenario would have seen:
48. “Amazon Mechanical Turk is a marketplace for work that requires human intelligence.
The Mechanical Turk service gives businesses access to a diverse, on-demand, scalable workforce
and gives Workers a selection of thousands of tasks to complete whenever it’s convenient.” Gen-
eral Questions, AMAZON, https://www.mturk.com/mturk/help?helpPage=overview#what_is (last
visited Jan. 29, 2017).
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FIGURE 3
DNA KIT WARNINGS
 
 
Unwarned 
You can buy a DNA testing service. The service 
takes a sample of your saliva and creates a profile of 
your ancestry and your chances of developing 
certain medical conditions. 
Warned 
NOTICE: The company offering this service sells 
access to its customers’ DNA data to 
pharmaceutical companies. 
Well-Educated 
(risk) 
Your identifying information is not included in the 
database that pharmaceutical companies can access. 
The pharmaceutical companies use the data to 
conduct medical research that may lead to the 
development of new treatments. 
(benefit) 
By selling access to the DNA database, this DNA 
service can afford to offer the testing kit for sale 
directly to you. Previously, DNA health analysis 
was available only at a doctor’s office. 
 Above which price would you definitely not buy the 
service because you did not think it was worth the 
money? 
A. Clearly Informational Disclosures
A clearly informational disclosure should provide information
about a material attribute without causing an overreaction.  To be ma-
terial, the perfectly educated consumer should have a different valua-
tion from the unwarned consumer.  If, on average, the perfectly
informed consumers have lower reserve prices than the unwarned
consumers, then materiality will be met.49  Materiality would look
something like this:50
49. We use differences in averages to define materiality.  However, because willingness to pay
is usually skewed right (like income), in our experiment we use averages of the natural log of the
reserve price.  The function “ln(price)” produces a distribution that is much closer to normal.
Throughout this Article, we report prices in dollars rather than log-dollars for the sake of reada-
bility, but for our analyses of statistical significance, we use mean log-price.
50. Bambauer et al., Bad Education, supra note 7, at 22. R
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FIGURE 4
MATERIALITY OF DISCLOSURE
The shift in the distributions (D1) shows that many consumers over-
value the product because they do not understand a latent negative
feature.  It is not necessarily the case that all consumers will value the
product less with proper information, but the gap between the medi-
ans of the distributions suggests that, on average, disclosure would
help consumers make more accurate assessments of a product’s value.
The inquiry is not over.  Even if an attribute is material to consum-
ers’ valuation of a good or service, a disclosure may cause an over-
reaction.  Disclosures are necessarily crude and focus attention on
risk, so they will provide a net benefit only if a warned consumer who
receives disclosure makes consumption decisions more similar to the
perfectly informed consumer than does the unwarned consumer.  A
clearly informational disclosure could produce distributions like this:51
51. Bambauer et al., Bad Education, supra note 7, at 25. R
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FIGURE 5
CLEARLY INFORMATIONAL DISCLOSURE
The disclosure both addresses a material attribute and does so in a
way that is not unduly distortive because the bias from overcorrection
is smaller than the bias when there is no disclosure at all (D2< D1).
Our proof-of-concept study found that pharmaceutical drug warn-
ings can have this quality.  We tested consumer reactions to notices
about the drug Vioxx (without using its name).52  This pain drug was
removed from the market in 2004 after a post-market studies showed
that the drug doubled its user’s risk of heart attack and stroke.53  The
results of our study show that the risks posed by Vioxx’s side effects
are material and that the notice did not cause consumer overreaction.
In fact, consumers may have underreacted to the disclosure.54
52. Text: “You have the opportunity to buy a drug to help manage pain caused by your arthri-
tis. / NOTICE: This drug has side effects that can increase the chance of heart attack and stroke.
/ This drug nearly doubles the chance that you will suffer a heart attack or stroke.  This drug has
a lower chance of causing ulcers and holes in your stomach than the other available painkillers.”
Bambauer et al., Bad Education, supra note 7, at 36. R
53. Steven Reinberg, Vioxx’s Heart Risk Lingered Long After Use Ended, WASH. POST (Oct.
14, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/B2008/10/13/AR
2008101302259.html.
54. Id.
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FIGURE 6
VIOXX DISCLOSURE
Median Price Proportion of $0 Value
Unwarned (40) $67.50** 0.0%
Warned (39) $40.00 7.7%
Well-Educated (40) $27.50 7.5%
* = statistically significant difference from the Well-Educated group at the 5% level; ** p<.01;
*** p<.001.
Interestingly, in contrast to the D.C. Circuit opinion in NAM v.
SEC,55 our results for disclosures about conflict diamonds also met the
standards for an informational disclosure (although a replication with
more power may find that disclosure causes an overreaction).56
55. 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
56. Bambauer et al., Bad Education, supra note 7, at 38. R
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FIGURE 7
CONFLICT DIAMOND DISCLOSURE
Median Price Proportion of $0 Value
Unwarned (39) $800.00* 0.0%
Warned (40) $300.00 12.5%
Well-Educated (37) $500.00 2.5%
* = statistically significant difference from the Well-Educated group at the 5% level; ** p<.01;
*** p<.001.
The only scenario related to the collection of personal data we
tested that met the standards for a clearly informational disclosure
was a notice about data security rather than privacy.  The vignette
concerned a vulnerability that allowed hackers to discover the geolo-
cation of Skype users.57  Both the warned and well-educated respon-
dents valued the service less than the unwarned subjects, consistent
with a valuable disclosure.58
57. Text: “You can buy a service that makes and receives phone calls for you over the internet.
/ NOTICE: The service exposes your location data from the last call you made. / A person who
wanted to harass you would have to know your account username and where to look for this
exposed information. / The service can avoid exposing location data.  The quality of the phone
calls would have been very slightly lowered.”
58. Bambauer et al., Bad Education, supra note 7, at 49. R
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FIGURE 8
SKYPE DATA SECURITY
Median Price Proportion of $0 Value
Unwarned (39) $50.00* 2.6%
Warned (40) $27.50 10.0%
Well-Educated (40) $25.00 12.5%
* = statistically significant difference from the Well-Educated group at the 5% level; ** p<.01;
*** p<.001.
Of course, mandated disclosure may not be the correct regulatory
response to any of these problems.  There are many alternatives to
mandated disclosure that would better suit the dangers of poor data
security.  As with Vioxx, consumer choice is not a compelling value
with respect to the risk of data hacking and unintentional data spills,
so direct regulations through negligence or specially designed cyber-
security laws may be a better fit.  None of the privacy scenarios met
the definition of “clearly informational.”
B. Potentially Informational Disclosures: Preference-Matching
Mandated disclosures could affect consumer choices without meet-
ing the materiality test described above.  Consumers may have varying
responses to new information such that some value the product less
while others value it more.  If, on average, the curve shifts one way or
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-2\DPL201.txt unknown Seq: 19  7-JUL-17 11:01
2017] PRIVACY POLICIES 521
the other, materiality would be met, and it would mean that the attri-
bute is, on net, either (1) a feature or (2) a bug.  If, however, accurate
information changes the shape of the distribution curve without shift-
ing the median price consumers are willing to pay,59 then the attribute
is neither positive nor negative.
Here is an example in which perfect information about an attribute
would spread consumers out along the willingness-to-pay axis even
though the curves are still centered around the same average:60
FIGURE 9
PERFECT INFORMATION
These attributes are influential for consumers even if they are not
material.  It is well worth keeping in mind that the indifference to va-
riance in our definition of materiality only applies to situations in
which there is no difference in medians.  As long as consumers are
spread out by better information in a way that shifts the curve to
center around slightly lower prices, materiality will be met.  For exam-
ple, materiality would be met in this case:61
59. Note that because reserve prices are usually right-skewed, I use median as the best mea-
sure of the first moment.  To test statistical significance, I used t-tests on the average of the
log(price).  Taking the natural log removed most of the skew.
60. Bambauer et al., Bad Education, supra note 7, at 23. R
61. Id. at 25.
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FIGURE 10
MATERIALITY
For attributes that change the shape of the valuation curve without
changing the mean reserve price, the curves for the warned group
must not shift the curve at all.  That is, the three curves for warned,
unwarned, and informed consumers must produce results for which D1
= D2 = 0.  Otherwise, the disclosure will cause a consumer overreaction
that is larger than any salutary effect disclosure could have caused.
Even when a disclosure avoids consumer overreaction, it is not clear
that the First Amendment would tolerate mandated disclosures of
nonmaterial attributes.  The practice could be seen as an attempt by
government to shape future preferences or to serve the interests of a
minority of consumers who have idiosyncratic preferences about a
feature that is not clearly harmful.  Disclosures about nonmaterial at-
tributes may also lack a good policy rationale.  Firms of course have
the option of providing voluntary disclosures to distinguish themselves
and attract the consumers who value the attribute, and the minority of
consumers who see the attribute as a negative flaw can do their own
research without burdening the entire market.
In our experiment, disclosures about testing a cosmetic product on
animals produced these type of nonmaterial but influential results.62
Our test of data selling by a 23andMe style of DNA kit did so as
well.63
62. Id. at 45.
63. Text: “You can buy a DNA testing service. The service takes a sample of your saliva and
creates a profile of your ancestry and your chances of developing certain medical conditions.
/ NOTICE: The company offering this service sells access to its customers’ DNA data to drug
companies. / Your identifying information is not included in the database that drug companies
can access.  The drug companies use the data to conduct medical research that may lead to the
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FIGURE 11
DNA DATA SELLING
Median Price Proportion of $0 Value
Unwarned (77) $100.00 1.3%
Warned (79) $50.00 2.5%
Well-Educated (78) $72.50 1.3%
* = statistically significant difference from the Well-Educated group at the 5% level; ** p<.01;
*** p<.001.
The results for the DNA kit confirm that reactions to data privacy are
bi-modal—for some, loss of control of their data detracts from the
value of the product while others respond to it positively, perhaps be-
cause they assume the services will improve faster and give them ben-
efits down the road.
C. Potentially Ideological Disclosures: Useless Notices
Moving further in the ideological direction, we next consider disclo-
sures about attributes for which the graphical distribution curves do
not change at all, not even in shape or variance.  These attributes are
development of new treatments. / By selling access to the DNA database, this DNA service can
afford to offer the testing kit for sale directly to you.  Previously, DNA health analysis was
available only at a doctor’s office.”
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nonmaterial and noninfluential.64  As with the potentially informa-
tional category discussed in Part II.B, if a disclosure discussed in this
sub-Part causes a consumer overreaction it will fall into the category
of patently ideological.  This category of potentially ideological disclo-
sures will produce curves that are virtually identical to each other for
unwarned, warned, and perfectly informed consumers:
FIGURE 12
IDEOLOGICAL DISCLOSURES
These types of disclosures beg questions about what purpose they
serve and whether the costs of disclosure regimes are demonstrably
greater than their value.  In addition, they may suggest that the gov-
ernment is engaged in evangelism, attempting to inspire public con-
cern where little currently exists.
Two out of three of the privacy scenarios we tested in our proof-of-
concept study had the quality of a potentially ideological disclosure.
Here are the results for disclosures about automated scanning of
emails for behavioral advertising by a Gmail-style service:65
64. It is theoretically possible that consumers could swap positions within the curve in a per-
fect mirror image, but this is so unlikely that the default interpretation, without evidence to the
contrary, should be that the attribute is not relevant to consumer decisions.
65. Text: “You can buy a service that stores, sends, and receives emails for you online.  The
service can conveniently be accessed online from any computer. / NOTICE: The company offer-
ing this service automatically scans your emails to predict your preferences and to target adver-
tisements to you. / The company will be able to predict a wide range of your qualities and future
behaviors.  It will not disclose your communications to other companies. / The company uses the
scans of your emails and the extra revenues from advertisers to improve the security of your
email, to filter out spam emails, and to provide better tools to write and organize your emails.”
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FIGURE 13
GMAIL DISCLOSURE
Median Price Proportion of $0 Value
Unwarned (83) $5.00 14.5%
Warned (82) $5.00 12.2%
Well-Educated (81) $5.00 21.0%
* = statistically significant difference from the Well-Educated group at the 5% level; ** p<.01;
*** p<.001.
The change in the number of consumers valuing the experiment at
$0 were not significant, but they do suggest that with greater power,
some evidence of materiality could emerge.  On the other hand, they
may be explained by tech-savvy qualities of the experiment subjects.
For these consumers, perhaps they see access to their personal data as
payment enough for Google’s services.  Our study also tested the ef-
fects of disclosures that elaborated at a greater length on the uses and
data-sharing practices of the firm, which were more like privacy poli-
cies commonly employed at present.  They too produced similar
results.
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Disclosure about the risk of re-identifying anonymous DNA data66
are similarly nonmaterial:67
FIGURE 14
DNA REIDENTIFICATION RISK
Median Price Proportion of $0 Value
Unwarned (77) $100.00 1.3%
Warned (39) $99.00 0.0%
Well-Educated (40) $87.50 0.0%
* = statistically significant difference from the Well-Educated group at the 5% level; ** p<.01;
*** p<.001.
66. Bambauer et al., Bad Education, supra note 7, at 47.  Text: “You can buy a DNA testing R
service.  The service takes a sample of your saliva and creates a profile of your ancestry and your
chances of developing certain medical conditions. / NOTICE: Although your data is stored with-
out any identifying information, somebody with access to the data might be able to figure out
your identity. / The people who will access the DNA database are health researchers.  To date,
there have been no known malicious reidentification attacks of genomic data. / By retaining the
data, the service can conduct research that might lead to new medical and ancestry discoveries.”
We tested this because reidentification risk is a hotly contested policy topic. Compare Paul Ohm,
Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 1701, 1704, 1736, 1776 (2010), with Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets,
84 U. COL. L. REV. 1117, 1128, 1177 (2013), and Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons,
25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2, 9-10, 62 (2011).
67. Bambauer et al., Bad Education, supra note 7, at 47 & n.136. R
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D. Patently Ideological Disclosures: Distortion
Finally, if a disclosure regime causes the distributions to shift such
that the bias with disclosure is worse than the bias from nondisclosure
(D2> D1), then a mandated disclosure law would do worse than noth-
ing.  It would cause market distortion and consumer overreaction.68
FIGURE 15
MARKET DISTORTION
Many of the scenarios we tested had the quality of a patently ideologi-
cal disclosure, including the disclosure of a randomly selected chemi-
cal in shaving cream, trace levels of naturally occurring arsenic in rice,
genetically modified foods, and mercury in vaccines.  Here are the re-
sults for vaccines as an example:69
68. Id. at 26.
69. Id. at 41.
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FIGURE 16
VACCINE
Median Price Proportion of $0 Value
Unwarned (40) $75.00 2.5%
Warned (40) $20.00*** 10.0%
Well-Educated (38) $50.00 0.0%
* = statistically significant difference from the Well-Educated group at the 5% level; ** p<.01;
*** p<.001.
In early beta-testing, initial results showed a statistically-significant-
consumer-overreaction to a privacy disclosure, suggesting that
mandatory just-in-time disclosure ran a risk of scaring consumers
away from services that they would likely value had they been better
informed.70  However, after improving our instrument and colleting
new data, none of our privacy scenarios had the hallmarks of a pa-
tently ideological disclosure.  Thus, at least for the three privacy sce-
narios we tested, none suggest that mandated privacy policy laws are
distortive and clearly ideological.
The privacy disclosures tested in this small study fall somewhere
between potentially informational and potentially ideological.  Evi-
dence about the actual motives of regulators could therefore have a
70. These initial results came from a survey that used willingness to consume (a binary “yes/
no” decision) rather than the continuous variable of willingness to pay.
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decisive impact on the constitutional analysis.  If privacy regulators
demonstrate an intent to either incite fear among consumers or shape
future values, then mandated disclosures may be in First Amendment
hot water.71
The next Part steps away from the constitutional analysis and offers
guidance on good public policy.  The standards for an informational
disclosure should be treated as minimum requirements for sound dis-
closure rules.  They are not sufficient on their own to justify a new
disclosure regime.
IV. “INFORMATIONAL” STATUS AS A MINIMUM THRESHOLD
As regulators consider a possible mandated disclosure regime, the
compelled speech doctrine should mark the bare minimum for a suita-
ble rule.  Even if a disclosure meets the constitutional standard for an
informational disclosure under Zauderer, it is not necessarily wise to
compel it.
This Part briefly addresses three factors that can make an informa-
tional disclosure more or less appealing from a policy perspective.
First, even fully informed consumers can make decisions that are pre-
dictably irrational.  If consumers are likely to have biased judgment
despite (or because of) full information, regulators should consider
other options—either regulatory boldness or restraint.  Second, regu-
lators should take no comfort in reports that a particular disclosure is
“popular” or that consumers “demand to know.”  Every type of infor-
mation disclosure has resounding popular support.  Third, for broad-
disclosure regimes that cover a large subset of products or services,
regulators should ensure that a sizable portion of those disclosures
will be material and nondistortive—that is, that they are “clearly in-
formational” using the model in Part II.
A. Competing Paternalism
Conventional wisdom is that even consumers who have all of the
relevant and necessary information can make bad choices for them-
selves.  A number of heuristics and biases can cause the autonomous
choices of consumers to depart from what regulators and society can
tolerate.  For example, the FDA will remove a drug from the mar-
71. An additional problem, which other areas of mandated disclosure do not typically have, is
that the direct regulation of privacy may itself be unconstitutional.  Scholars disagree on this
question. See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 60–61 (2014); Neil M.
Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501,
1505 (2015); Felix T. Wu, The Constitutionality of Consumer Privacy Regulation, 2013 U. CHI. L.
REFORM 69, 72–73 (2013).
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ket—rather than rely solely on drug labeling—if the drug’s dangerous
side effects outweigh its utility for all patients.  Likewise, if consumers
make poor decisions about the revelation of their personal data that
cause significant downstream harm to themselves, government should
use direct regulations to override consumer choice.
Biases can also run the other way.  A consumer with complete in-
formation may nevertheless overreact to a factor that poses no credi-
ble risk.  For example, the “naturalism” bias affects consumers’
perception of genetically engineered foods (also known as GMOs),
causing them to disfavor GMOs even though the scientific evidence
shows that they are equally safe and more environmentally friendly
than traditional foods.  For that reason, the FDA declined to impose
mandatory GMO labeling despite significant consumer and industry
pressure.72
Our experimental results show that even the well-educated research
subjects had some misgivings:73
FIGURE 17
GMO
72. Guidance for Food Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have
Not Been Derived from Genetically Engineered Plants, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www
.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/LabelingNutri
tion/ucm059098.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2016).
73. Bambauer et al., Bad Education, supra note 7, at 42. R
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Status quo and anti-technology biases will affect how consumers re-
act to services that collect or use personal data in a new way.  For
example, when Caller ID was first introduced to the market, con-
sumer advocates objected and demanded legal prohibitions because of
perceived privacy invasions,74 but the service is now well-loved.  Like-
wise, just-in-time disclosures may have stopped or stunted the growth
of Gmail was first introduced, even though it is now clear  that con-
sumers value the free service despite the creepy contextual advertis-
ing.75  Thus, even new, material privacy attributes may be
inappropriate subjects for mandated disclosure if consumers are likely
to react with technophobic instincts.  Of course, it is difficult to tell in
the moment whether a new technology’s transgression of social norms
is causing fleeting resentment or lasting damage.
B. All Disclosure Laws Are Popular
One tempting justification to support mandated disclosures about
privacy is that even if disclosures ultimately affect decisions very little,
consumers like disclosure, and consumers feel that they have a “right
to know.”76  However, this provides no limiting principle, as consum-
ers consistently approve of disclosure no matter the subject.77  In our
study, we found that the lowest approval rating for mandatory disclo-
sure laws across all of our scenarios was 77% (for disclosure of
GMOs).  Most scenarios had approval ratings over 80%, including no-
tices about harmless components in vaccines, trace amounts of arsenic
in rice, and a randomly selected ingredient in shaving cream (i.e., our
test of a purely arbitrary notice).78  Privacy and drug-side-effect dis-
closures had the greatest support with approval above 90%, but these
may have received a bump in support from the fact that mandated
disclosure rules already exist.
Consumers have great enthusiasm for mandated disclosure because
they see each disclosure as practically costless for the companies and
potentially useful for some consumer.  As it turns out, they may think
74. Anthony Ramirez, Caller ID: Consumer’s Friend or Foe?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/04/news/caller-id-consumer-s-friend-or-foe.html.
75. Frederick Lardinois, Gmail Now Has 900M Active Users, 75% on Mobile, TECHCRUNCH
(May 28, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/05/28/gmail-now-has-900m-active-users-75-on-mo
bile/.
76. Right to Know Act, AB-1291, 2013–2014 Legis., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
77. For a thorough critique of this justification for mandated disclosures, see Jonathan H.
Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know,” 58 ARIZ. L. REV.
421, 437 (2016).
78. Moreover, mandated disclosure was popular no matter what level of information disclo-
sure the research subject saw in their vignette.
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that that consumer will eventually be themselves.  Our study tested an
emerging theory in the mass communications literature called the
“first person effect.”  The theory predicts that most people believe
they will make better use of information than the average person.79  It
is a special case of the more general “optimism bias” by which nearly
all people believe they are above average.  Our study asked respon-
dents in randomized order how well they believed they themselves
would make use of a disclosure about the tested attribute and how
well they believed the average person would make use of the disclo-
sure.  On a seven-point scale (with seven being the highest), respon-
dents gave themselves a 5.21 and the average consumer a 4.85—a
highly statistically significant gap.  As such, when regulators are con-
sidering which of an infinite universe of product attributes to select for
special attention in mandated disclosures, popularity does not help
much.
C. Variance Across Attributes and Products
Finally, many disclosure regimes cover a range of attributes across
an array of products or services.  The disclosure regime as a whole
may be valuable even if specific disclosures within the scheme are use-
less or distortive.  Mandatory nutrition labels and ingredients lists, for
example, may be very illuminating for consumers in some instances
(e.g., high calorie foods) and useless in others.  Drug labeling would
probably have the same quality—that disclosures for many drugs are
material even if some are not.  For a broad-sweeping mandatory dis-
closure scheme, regulators should have reason to think that a majority
or significant minority of the disclosures will satisfy the standards for a
clearly informational disclosure.  We were not able to test a large
range of privacy-related disclosures, which is a limitation of our proof-
of-concept empirical study.  We selected three privacy scenarios that
we thought were representative of a few common concerns, but they
do not offer definitive evidence that the majority of privacy disclo-
sures are nonmaterial or useless.  However, on the limited evidence
available, privacy disclosure mandates affect a wide swath of indus-
tries and services without evidence that they add significant value to
consumers in the typical cases.
79. Guy J. Golan & Anita G. Day, The First-Person Effect and Its Behavioral Consequences:
A New Trend in the Twenty-Five Year History of Third-Person Effect, 11 MASS COMM. & SOC’Y
539, 541–42 (2008).
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a theory that courts may adopt to differenti-
ate informational compelled disclosures from ideological ones.  Man-
dated disclosures that are useless to consumers or, worse still, that
mislead consumers by giving a distorted sense of risk, should violate
the basic principles of the compelled speech doctrine.  Disclosures
that alert consumers about a material attribute of the good or service
and cause appropriate changes in behavior, by contrast, should be
treated as purely informational disclosures that are consistent with Su-
preme Court precedent.  A middle category of disclosures—those that
merely help consumers match goods to their preferences—are consti-
tutionally suspect (though the courts have not yet worked out whether
they conflict with free speech rights).
Laws that require companies to disclose privacy policies may be in-
formational in some contexts, and may be merely preference-match-
ing or even ideological in others.  The results of a proof-of-concept
experiment suggest that most privacy policies are at best preference-
matching, and at times useless.  If these results are representative,
they indicate that federal and state laws mandating privacy disclosures
are vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
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